Nine Categoreal Obligations

1. the Category of Subjective Unity

( 1 ) Page 26:(i) the Category of Subjective Unity. The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject.

( 2 ) Page 222:There are three main categoreal conditions which flow from the final nature of things. These three conditions are: (i) the Category of Subjective Unity, (ii) the Category of Objective Identity, and (iii) the Category of Objective Diversity. Later we shall isolate five other categoreal conditions. But the three conditions mentioned above have an air of ultimate metaphysical generality.

( 3 ) Page 223: [342] This Category of Subjective Unity is the reason why no feeling can be abstracted from its subject. For the subject is at work in the feeling, in order that it may be the subject with that feeling. The feeling is an episode in self-production, and is referent to its aim. This aim is a certain definite unity with its companion feelings.

( 4 ) Page 248: The subjective form of a conceptual feeling is valuation. These valuations are subject to the Category of Subjective Unity. Thus the conceptual registration is conceptual valuation; and conceptual valuation introduces creative purpose. The mental pole introduces the subject as a determinant of its own concrescence. The mental pole is th1e subject determining its own ideal of itself by reference to eternal principles of valuation autonomously modified in their application to its own physical objective datum. Every actual entity is 'in time' so far as its physical pole is concerned, and is 'out of time' so far as its mental pole is concerned. It is the union of two worlds, namely, the temporal world, and the world of autonomous valuation. The integration of each simple physical feeling with its conceptual counterpart produces in a subsequent phase a physical feeling whose subjective form of re-enaction has gained or lost subjective intensity according to the valuation up, or the valuation down, in the conceptual feeling. So far there is merely subjective readjustment of the subjective forms.

( 5 ) Page 249: Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual [381] reproduction, and the second phase is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.1 There is a conceptual contrast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated. Seems to limit the strict application of Plato's principle of reminiscence, and of Hume's principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradict anything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigid application of Hume's principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted exceptions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the category states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of elements identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By the Category of Subjective Unity, and by the seventh Category of subjective Harmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governed by the subjective imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. Also by the Category of objective Identity this aptitude always has its ground in the two-way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in synthesis there must always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at contrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. The joint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, is partially expressed in this Category of conceptual Reversion. This 'aim at contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose is formulated in Category VIII.

2. the Category of Objective Identity

( 1 ) Page 26:(ii) the Category of Objective Identity. There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actual entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in the 'satisfaction.' Here, as always, the term 'satisfaction' means the one complex fully determinate feeling which is the completed phase in the process. This Category expresses that each element has one self-consistent function, however complex. Logic is the general analysis of self-consistency. (iii) The Category of Objective Diversity. There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction. 'coalescence' here means the notion of diverse elements exercising an absolute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in their diversities.

( 2 ) Page 222:There are three main categoreal conditions which flow from the final nature of things. These three conditions are: (i) the Category of Subjective Unity, (ii) the Category of objective identity, and (iii) the Category of Objective Diversity. Later we shall isolate five* * other categoreal conditions. But the three conditions mentioned above have an air of ultimate metaphysical generality.

( 3 ) Page 225:Category II. There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the satisfaction of an actual entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in that satisfaction. This is the 'Category of objective identity.' This Category asserts the essential self-identity of any entity as regards its status in each individualization of the universe. In such a concrescence one thing has one role, and cannot assume any duplicity. This is the very meaning of self-identity that, in any actual confrontation of thing with thing, one thing cannot confront itself in alien roles. Any one thing remains obstinately itself playing a part with self-consistent unity. This category is one ground of incompatibility.

( 4 ) Page 227:The fact that there is integration at all arises from the condition expressed by the Category of objective identity. The same entity, be it actual entity or be it eternal object, cannot be felt twice in the formal constitution of one concrescence. The incomplete phases with their many feelings of one object are only to be interpreted in terms of the final satisfaction with its one feeling of that one object. Thus objective identity requires integration of the many feelings of one object into the one feeling of that object. The analysis of an actual entity is only intellectual, or, to speak with a wider scope, only objective. Each actual entity is a cell with atomic unity. But in analysis it can only be understood as a process; it can only be felt as a process, that is to say, as in passage. The actual entity is divisible; but is in fact undivided. The divisibility can thus only refer to its objectifications in which it transcends itself. But such transcendence is self -revelation.

( 5 ) Page 228:This category is in truth only a particular application of the second category. For a 'status' is after all something; and, according to the Category of objective identity, it cannot duplicate its role. Thus if the 'status' be the status of this, it cannot in the same sense be the status of that. The prohibition of sham diversities of status sweeps away the 'class-theory' of particular substances, which was waveringly suggested by Locke (II, XXIII, I ), was more emphatically endorsed by Hume (Treatise, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. 6), and has been adopted by Hume's followers. For the essence of a class is that it assigns no diversity of function to the members of its extension. The members of a class are diverse members in virtue of mere logical disjunction. The 'class,' thus appealed to, is a mere multiplicity. But in the prevalent discussion of classes, there are illegitimate transitions to the notions of a 'nexus' and of a 'proposition.' The appeal to a class to perform the services of a proper entity is exactly analogous to an appeal to an imaginary terrier to kill a real rat.

( 6 ) Page 238: A simple physical feeling enjoys a characteristic which has been variously described as 're-enaction,' 'reproduction,' and 'conformation.' This characteristic can be more accurately explained in terms of the eternal objects involved. There are eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the objective datum which is the 'cause,' and eternal objects determinant of the definiteness of the subjective form belonging to the 'effect.' When there is re-enaction there is one eternal object with two-way functioning, namely, as partial determinant of the objective datum, and as partial determinant of the subjective form. In this two-way role, the eternal object is functioning relationally between the initial data on the one hand and the concrescent subject on the other. It is playing one self-consistent role in obedience to the Category of objective identity.

( 7 ) Page 249: Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual [381] reproduction, and the second phase is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.1 There is a conceptual contrast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated. Seems to limit the strict application of Plato's principle of reminiscence, and of Hume's principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradict anything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigid application of Hume's principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted exceptions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the category states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of elements identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By the Category of Subjective Unity, and by the seventh Category of subjective Harmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governed by the subjective imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. Also by the Category of objective identity this aptitude always has its ground in the two-way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in synthesis there must always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at contrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. The joint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, is partially expressed in this category of conceptual Reversion. This 'aim at contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose is formulated in Category VIII.

( 8 ) Page 266:In an intellectual feeling the datum is the generic contrast between a nexus of actual entities and a proposition with its logical subjects members of the nexus. In every generic contrast its unity arises from the two-way functioning of certain entities which are components in each of the contrasted factors. This unity expresses the conformation to the second categoreal condition (the Category of objective identity). The common 'subject' entertaining the two feelings effects an integration whereby each of these actual entities obtains its one role of a two-way functioning in the one generic contrast. As an element in the subject no objectified actual entity can play two disconnected parts. There can only be one analysable part. Thus what in origination is describable as a pair of distinct ways of functioning of each actual entity in the two factors of the generic contrast respectively is realized in the subject as one role with a two-way aspect. This two-way aspect is unified as 'contrast.' This one analysable part involves in itself the contrast between the sheer matter of fact, namely, what the objectified actual entity in question contributes to the objectified nexus in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality of the same actual entity for playing its assigned part in the predicative pattern of the proposition. in the eventuality of the proposition's realization. This contrast is what has been termed the 'affirmation-negation contrast.' It is the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the propositional feeling. It is the contrast between 'in fact' and 'might be,' in respect to particular instances in this actual world. The subjective form of the feeling of this contrast is consciousness. Thus in experience, consciousness arises by reason of intellectual feelings, and in proportion to the variety and intensity of such feelings. But, in conformity with the seventh [408] categoreal condition (the Category of subjective Harmony), subjective forms, which arise as factors in any feeling, are finally in the satisfaction shared in the unity of all feelings; all feelings acquire their quota of irradiation in consciousness.

( 9 ) Page 271:The intuitive judgment is the comparative feeling with its datum constituted by the generic contrast between the nexus involved in the indicative feeling and the proposition involved in the imaginative feeling. In this generic contrast each actual entity has its contrast of two-way functioning. One way is its functioning in the exemplified pattern of the nexus, and the other way is its functioning in the potential pattern of the proposition. If in addition to the contrast between exemplification and potentiality, there be identity as to pattern and predicate, then by the Category of objective Unity there is also the single complex eternal object in its two-way functioning, namely, as exemplified and as potential. In this case, the proposition coheres with the nexus and this coherence is its truth. Thus 'truth' is the absence of incompatibility or of any 'material contrast' in the patterns of the nexus and of the proposition in their generic contrast. The sole contrast, involving the category of objective Diversity, is merely that between exemplification and potentiality, and in all other respects the coherence is governed by the Category of objective identity.

3. the Category of Objective Diversity

( 1 ) Page 26:(ii) the Category of objective identity. There can be no duplication of any element in the objective datum of the 'satisfaction' of an actual entity, so far as concerns the function of that element in the 'satisfaction.' Here, as always, the term 'satisfaction' means the one complex fully determinate feeling which is the completed phase in the process. This category expresses that each element has one self-consistent function, however complex. Logic is the general analysis of self-consistency. (iii) the Category of Objective Diversity. There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction. 'coalescence' here means the notion of diverse elements exercising an absolute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in their diversities.

( 3 ) Page 225: Category III. There can be no 'coalescence' of diverse elements in the objective datum of an actual entity, so far as concerns the functions of those elements in that satisfaction. This is the 'Category of Objective Diversity.' Here the term 'coalescence' means the self-contradictory notion of diverse elements exercising an absolute identity of function, devoid of the contrasts inherent in their diversities. In other words, in a real complex unity each particular component imposes its own particularity on its status. No entity can have an abstract status in a real unity. Its status must be such that only it can fill and only that actuality can supply. [345] The neglect of this category is a prevalent error in metaphysical reasoning. This category is another ground of incompatibility.

( 4 ) Page 227:[348] The third category is concerned with the antithesis to oneness, namely, diversity. An actual entity is not merely one; it is also definitely complex. But, to be definitely complex is to include definite diverse elements in definite ways. the Category of Objective Diversity expresses the inexorable condition that a complex unity must provide for each of its components a real diversity of status, with a reality which bears the same sense as its own reality and is peculiar to itself. In other words, a real unity cannot provide sham diversities of status for its diverse components.

( 5 ) Page 271:The intuitive judgment is the comparative feeling with its datum constituted by the generic contrast between the nexus involved in the indicative feeling and the proposition involved in the imaginative feeling. In this generic contrast each actual entity has its contrast of two-way functioning. One way is its functioning in the exemplified pattern of the nexus, and the other way is its functioning in the potential pattern of the proposition. If in addition to the contrast between exemplification and potentiality, there be identity as to pattern and predicate, then by the Category of Objective Unity there is also the single complex eternal object in its two-way functioning, namely, as exemplified and as potential. In this case, the proposition coheres with the nexus and this coherence is its truth. Thus 'truth' is the absence of incompatibility or of any 'material contrast' in the patterns of the nexus and of the proposition in their generic contrast. The sole contrast, involving the Category of Objective Diversity, is merely that between exemplification and potentiality, and in all other respects the coherence is governed by the Category of Objective Identity.

4. the Category of Conceptual Valuation

( 1 ) Page 53: The principle that I am adopting is that consciousness presupposes experience, and not experience consciousness. It is a special element in the subjective forms of some feelings. Thus an actual entity may, or may not, be conscious of some part of its experience. Its experience is its complete formal constitution, including its consciousness, if any. Thus, in Locke's phraseology, its 'ideas of particular things' are those other things exercising their function as felt components of its constitution. Locke would only term them 'ideas' when these objectifications belong to that region of experience lit up by consciousness. In section 4 of the same chapter, he definitely makes all knowledge to be "founded in particular things." He writes : ". . . yet a distinct name for every particular thing would not be of any great use for the improvement of knowledge: which, though founded in particular things 16 enlarges itself by general views; to which things reduced into sorts under general names, are properly subservient." Thus for Locke, in this passage, there are not first the qualities and then the conjectural particular things; but conversely. Also he illustrates his meaning of a 'particular thing' by a 'leaf,' a 'crow,' a 'sheep.' a 'grain of sand.' so he is not thinking of a particular patch of color, or other sense-datum. For example, [84] in section 7 of the same chapter. in reference to children he writes : "The ideas of the nurse and the mother are well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals." This doctrine of Locke's must be compared with Descartes' doctrine of 'realitas objectiva.' Locke inherited the dualistic separation of mind from body. If he had started with the one fundamental notion of an actual entity. the complex of ideas disclosed in consciousness would have at once turned into the complex constitution of the actual entity disclosed in its own consciousness, so far as it is conscious fitfully. Partially, or not at all. Locke definitely states how ideas become general. In section 6 of the chapter he writes : ". . . and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence." Thus for Locke the abstract idea is preceded by the 'idea of a particular existent'; "[children] frame an idea which they find those many particulars do partake in." This statement of Locke's should be compared with the Category of Conceptual Valuation, which is the fourth categoreal obligation.

( 2 ) Page 225:The ground, or origin, of the concrescent process is the multiplicity of data in the universe, actual entities and eternal objects and propositions and nexus. Each new phase in the concrescence means the retreat of mere propositional unity before the growing grasp of real unity of feeling. Each successive propositional phase is a lure to the creation of feelings which promote its realization. Each temporal entity, in one sense, originates from its mental pole, analogously to God himself. It derives from God its basic conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions. This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings. These decisions are impossible for the nascent creature antecedently to the novelties in the phases of its concrescence. But this statement in its turn requires amplification. With this amplification the doctrine, that the primary phase of a temporal actual entity is physical, is recovered. A 'physical feeling' is here defined to be the feeling of another actuality. If the other actuality be objectified by its conceptual feelings, the physical feeling of the subject in question is termed 'hybrid.' Thus the primary phase is a hybrid physical feeling of cod, in respect to God's conceptual feeling which is immediately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence. There is then, according to the Category of Conceptual Valuation, i.e., categoreal obligation Iv, a derived conceptual feeling which reproduces for the subject the data and valuation of God's conceptual feeling. This conceptual feeling is the initial conceptual aim referred to in the preceding statement. In this sense, God can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity. But the phrase is apt to be misleading by [344] its suggestion that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God's volition. The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action. It is the function of actuality to characterize the creativity, and God is the eternal primordial character. But, of course, there is no meaning to 'creativity' apart from its 'creatures,' and no meaning to 'God' apart from the 'creativity' and the 'temporal creatures,' and no meaning to the 'temporal creatures' apart from 'creativity' and 'God.'

( 3 ) Page 266:We have now to examine two simple types of comparative feelings. One type arises from the integration of a 'propositional feeling' with the 'indicative feeling' from which it is partly derived. Feelings of this type will be termed 'intellectual feelings.' This type of comparative feelings is subdivided into two species: one species consists of 'conscious perceptions'; and the other species consists' of 'intuitive judgments.' The subjective forms of intuitive judgments also involve consciousness. Thus 'conscious perceptions' and 'intuitive judgments' are alike 'intellectual feelings.' comparative feelings of the other type are termed 'physical purposes.' such a feeling arises from the integration of a conceptual feeling with the basic physical feeling from which it is derived, either directly according to categoreal condition IV (the Category of Conceptual Valuation), or indirectly according to Categoreal Condition V (the Category of Conceptual Reversion). But this integration is a more primitive type of integration than that which produces, from the same basic physical feeling, the species of propositional feelings termed 'perceptive.' The subjective forms of these physical purposes are either 'adversions' or 'aversions.' The subjective forms of physical purposes do not involve consciousness unless these feelings acquire integration with conscious perceptions or intuitive judgments. [407]

5. the Category of Conceptual Reversion

( 1 ) Page 26: (v) the Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the first phase of the mental pole. The diversity is a relevant diversity determined by the subjective aim.

( 2 ) Page 104: The theory of a corpuscular society, made up of many enduring entities, fits the evidence no better. The same objections apply. The root fact is that 'endurance' is a device whereby an occasion is peculiarly bound by a single line of physical ancestry, while 'life' means novelty, introduced in accordance with the Category of Conceptual Reversion. There are the same objections to many traditions as there are to one tradition. What has to be explained is originality of response to stimulus. This amounts to the doctrine that an organism is 'alive' when in some measure its reactions are inexplicable by any tradition of pure physical inheritance.

( 3 ) Page 247:Those of God's feelings which are positively prehended are those with some compatibility of contrast, or of identity, with physical feelings transmitted from the temporal world. But when we take God into account, then we can assert without any qualification Hume's principle, that all conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings. The limitation of Hume's principle introduced by the consideration of the Category of Conceptual Reversion (cf. Sect. III of this chapter) is to be construed as referring merely to the transmission from the temporal world, leaving God out of account.

( 4 ) Page 249: Category V. the Category of Conceptual Reversion. There is secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole; the determination of identity and diversity depending on the subjective aim at attaining depth of intensity by reason of contrast.

( 5 ) Page 249: Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual [381] reproduction, and the second phase is a phase of Conceptual Reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.1 There is a conceptual contrast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated. Seems to limit the strict application of Plato's principle of reminiscence, and of Hume's principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradict anything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigid application of Hume's principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted exceptions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the category states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of elements identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By the Category of Subjective Unity, and by the seventh Category of subjective Harmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governed by the subjective imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. Also by the Category of Objective Identity this aptitude always has its ground in the two-way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in synthesis there must always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at contrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. The joint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, is partially expressed in this Category of Conceptual Reversion. This 'aim at contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose is formulated in Category VIII.

( 6 ) Page 266:We have now to examine two simple types of comparative feelings. One type arises from the integration of a 'propositional feeling' with the 'indicative feeling' from which it is partly derived. Feelings of this type will be termed 'intellectual feelings.' This type of comparative feelings is subdivided into two species: one species consists of 'conscious perceptions'; and the other species consists' of 'intuitive judgments.' The subjective forms of intuitive judgments also involve consciousness. Thus 'conscious perceptions' and 'intuitive judgments' are alike 'intellectual feelings.' comparative feelings of the other type are termed 'physical purposes.' such a feeling arises from the integration of a conceptual feeling with the basic physical feeling from which it is derived, either directly according to categoreal condition IV (the Category of Conceptual Valuation), or indirectly according to Categoreal Condition V (the Category of Conceptual Reversion). But this integration is a more primitive type of integration than that which produces, from the same basic physical feeling, the species of propositional feelings termed 'perceptive.' The subjective forms of these physical purposes are either 'adversions' or 'aversions.' The subjective forms of physical purposes do not involve consciousness unless these feelings acquire integration with conscious perceptions or intuitive judgments. [407]

( 7 ) Page 279:When this reverted conceptual feeling acquires a relatively high intensity of upward valuation in its subjective form, the resulting integration of physical feeling, primary conceptual feeling, and secondary conceptual feeling, produces a more complex physical purpose than in the former case when the reverted conceptual feeling was negligible. There is now the physical feeling as valued by its integration with the primary conceptual feeling, the integration with the contrasted secondary conceptual feeling, the heightening of the scale of subjective intensity by the introduction of conceptual contrast, and the concentration of this heightened intensity upon the reverted [426] feeling in virtue of its being the novel factor introducing the contrast. The physical purpose thus provides the creativity with a complex character, which is governed (i) by the Category of Conceptual Reversion, in virtue of which the secondary conceptual feeling arises, (ii) by the Category of Transmutation, in virtue of which conceptual feeling can be transmitted as physical feeling, (iii) by the Category of Subjective Harmony, in virtue of which the subjective forms of the two conceptual feelings are adjusted to procure the subjective aim, and (iv) by the Category of Subjective Intensity, in virtue of which the aim is determined to the attainment of balanced intensity from feelings integrated in virtue of near-identity, and contrasted in virtue of reversions.

6. the Category of Transmutation

( 1 ) Page 27:(vi) the Category of Transmutation. When (in accordance with Category [iv], or with categories [iv] and [v] ) one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual world, then, in a subsequent phase of integration of these simple physical feelings together with the derivate conceptual feeling. the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a characteristic of some nexus containing those prehended actual entities among its members, or of some part of that nexus. In this way the nexus (or its part), thus characterized, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this prehending subject. It is evident that the complete datum of the transmuted feeling is a contrast, namely, 'the nexus, as one, in contrast with the eternal object.' This type of contrast is one of the meanings of the notion 'qualification of physical substance by quality.' This category is the way in which the philosophy of organism, which is an atomic theory of actuality, meets a perplexity which is inherent in all monadic cosmologies. Leibniz in his Monadology)' meets the same difficulty by a theory of 'confused' perception. But he fails to make clear how 'confusion' originates.

( 2 ) Page 63:(iii ) possibilities of division. These possibilities of division constitute the external world a continuum. For a continuum is divisible; so far as the contemporary world is divided by actual entities, it is not a continuum, but is atomic. Thus the contemporary world is perceived with its potentiality for extensive division, and not in its actual atomic division. The contemporary world as perceived by the senses is the datum for contemporary actuality, and is therefore continuous divisible but not divided. The contemporary world is in fact divided and atomic, being a multiplicity of definite actual entities. These contemporary actual entities are divided from each other, and are not themselves divisible into other contemporary actual entities. This antithesis will have to be discussed later (cf. Part Iv). But it is necessary to adumbrate it here. -This limitation of the way in which the contemporary actual entities are relevant to the 'formal' existence of the subject in question is the first example of the general [97] principle, that objectification relegates into irrelevance, or into a subordinate relevance, the full constitution of the objectified entity. Some real component in the objectified entity assumes the role of being how that particular entity is a datum in the experience of the subject. In this case the objectified contemporaries are only directly relevant to the subject in their character of arising from a datum which is an extensive continuum. They do, in fact, atomize this continuum; but the aboriginal potentiality, which they include and realize, is what they con-tribute as the relevant factor in their objectifications. They thus exhibit the community of contemporary actualities as a common world with mathematical relations where the term 'mathematical' is used in the sense in which it would have been understood by Plato, Euclid, and Descartes, before the modern discovery of the true definition of pure mathematics. The bare mathematical potentialities of the extensive continuum require an additional content in order to assume the role of real objects for the subject. This content is supplied by the eternal objects termed sense-data. These objects are 'given' for the experience of the subject. Their givenness does not arise from the 'decision' of the contemporary entities which are thus objectified. It arises from the functioning of the antecedent physical body of the subject; and this functioning can in its turn be analyzed as representing the influence of the more remote past, a past common alike to the subject and to its contemporary actual entities. Thus these sense-data are eternal objects playing a complex relational role; They connect the actual entities of the past with the actual entities of the contemporary world, and thereby effect objectifications of the contemporary things and of the past things. For instance, we see the contemporary chair, but we see it with our eyes; and we touch the contemporary chair, but we touch it with our hands. Thus colours objectify the chair in one way. and objectify the eyes in another way, as elements in the experience of the subject. [98] Also touch objectifies the chair in one way, and objectifies the hands in another way, as elements in the experience of the subject. But the eyes and the hands are in the past (the almost immediate past) and the chair is in the present. The chair. thus objectified, is the objectification of a contemporary nexus of actual entities in its unity as one nexus. This nexus is illustrated as to its constitution by the spatial region, with its perspective relations. This region is, in fact. atomized by the members of the nexus. By the operation of the Category of Transmutation (cf. Parts III and IV), in the objectification an abstraction is made from the multiplicity of members and from all components of their formal constitutions, except the occupation of this region. This prehension, in the particular example considered, will be termed the prehension of a 'chair- image.' Also the intervention of the past is not confined to antecedent eyes and hands. There is a more remote past throughout nature external to the body. The direct relevance of this remote past, relevant by reason of its direct objectification in the immediate subject, is practically negligible, so far as concerns prehensions of a strictly physical type.

( 3 ) Page 63: A reference to the Category of Transmutation will show that perception of contemporary 'images' in the mode of 'presentational immediacy' is an 'impure' prehension. The subsidiary 'pure' physical prehensions are the components which provide some definite information as to the physical world; the subsidiary 'pure' mental prehensions are the components by reason of which the theory of 'secondary qualities' was introduced into the theory of perception. The account here given traces back these secondary qualities to their root .in physical prehensions expressed by the 'withness of the body.' . .

( 4 ) Page 65: The conclusion of this discussion is that the ingression of the eternal objects termed 'sense-data' into the experience of a subject cannot be construed as the simple objectification of the actual entity to which, in ordinary speech, we ascribe that sense-datum as a quality. The ingression involves a complex relationship, whereby the sense-datum emerges as the 'given' eternal object by which some past entities are objectified ( for ex-ample, colour seen with the eyes and bad temper inherited from the viscera) and whereby the sense-datum also enters into the objectification of a society of actual entities in the contemporary world. Thus a sense-datum has ingression into experience by reason of its forming the what of a very complex multiple integration of prehensions within that occasion. For example, the ingression of a visual sense-datum involves the causal objectification of various antecedent bodily organs and the presentational objectification of the shape seen, this shape being a nexus of contemporary actual entities. In this account of the ingression of sense-data, the animal body is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the antecedent settled world. To sum up this account: when we perceive a con-temporary extended shape which we term a 'chair,' the sense- [101] data involved are not necessarily elements in the 'real internal constitution' of this chair-image: they are elements in some way of feeling in the 'real internal constitutions' of those antecedent organs of the human body with which we perceive the 'chair.' The direct recognition of such antecedent actual entities, with which we perceive contemporaries, is hindered and, apart from exceptional circumstances, rendered impossible by the spatial and temporal vagueness which infect such data. Later (cf. Part III, Chs. III to V) the whole question of this perception of a nexus vaguely, that is to say, without distinction of the actual entities composing it, is discussed in terms of the theory of prehensions, and in relation to the Category of Transmutation.

( 5 ) Page 101: This mode of solution requires the intervention of mentality operating in accordance with the Category of Transmutation (i.e., Categoreal Obligation VI ) . It ignores diversity of detail by overwhelming the nexus by means of some congenial uniformity which pervades it. The environment may then change indefinitely so far as concerns the ignored details--so long as they can be ignored. '

( 6 ) Page 101: Such mentality represents the first grade of ascent beyond the mere reproductive stage which employs nothing more than the category of conceptual Reproduction (i.e., categoreal obligation Iv). There is some initiative of conceptual integration, but no originality in conceptual prehension. This initiative belongs to the Category of Transmutation, and the excluded originality belongs to the Category of Reversion.

( 7 ) Page 114:�@[174] The more primitive types of experience are concerned with sense-reception, and not with sense-perception. This statement will require some prolonged explanation. But the course of thought can be indicated by adopting Bergson's admirable phraseology, sense-reception is 'unspatialized,' and sense-perception is 'spatialized.' In sense-reception the sensa are the definiteness of emotion: they are emotional forms transmitted from occasion to occasion. Finally in some occasion of adequate complexity, the Category of Transmutation endows them with the new function of characterizing nexus.

( 8 ) Page 251: [384] Category VI. the Category of Transmutation. When (in accordance with category IV, or with categories IV and V) one and the same conceptual feeling is derived impartially by a prehending subject from its analogous simple physical feelings of various actual entities, then in a subsequent phase of integration of these simple physical feelings together with the derivate conceptual feeling the prehending subject may transmute the datum of this conceptual feeling into a contrast with the nexus of those prehended actual entities, or of some part of that nexus; so that the nexus (or its part), thus qualified, is the objective datum of a feeling entertained by this prehending subject.

( 9 ) Page 254: It is evident that adversion and aversion, and also the Category of Transmutation, only have importance in the case of high-grade organisms. They constitute the first step towards intellectual mentality, though in themselves they do not amount to consciousness. But an actual entity which includes these operations must have an important intensity of conceptual feelings able to mask and fuse the simple physical feelings.

( 10 ) Page 254: Also the examination of the Category of Transmutation shows that the approach to intellectuality consists in the gain of a power of abstraction. The irrelevant multiplicity of detail is eliminated, and emphasis is laid on the elements of systematic order in the actual world. In [389] so far as there is trivial order, there must be trivialized actual entities. The right coordination of the negative prehensions is one secret of mental progress; but unless some systematic scheme of relatedness characterizes the environment, there will be nothing left whereby to constitute vivid prehension of the world. The low-grade organism is merely the summation of the forms of energy which flow in upon it in all their multiplicity of detail. It receives, and it transmits; but it fails to simplify into intelligible system. The physical theory of the structural flow of energy has to do with the transmission of simple physical feelings from individual actuality to individual actuality. Thus some sort of quantum theory in physics, relevant to the existing type of cosmic order, is to be expected. The physical theory of alternative forms of energy, and of the transformation from one form to another form, ultimately depends upon transmission conditioned by some exemplification of the Categories of Transmutation and Reversion.

( 11 ) Page 279:When this reverted conceptual feeling acquires a relatively high intensity of upward valuation in its subjective form, the resulting integration of physical feeling, primary conceptual feeling, and secondary conceptual feeling, produces a more complex physical purpose than in the former case when the reverted conceptual feeling was negligible. There is now the physical feeling as valued by its integration with the primary conceptual feeling, the integration with the contrasted secondary conceptual feeling, the heightening of the scale of subjective intensity by the introduction of conceptual contrast, and the concentration of this heightened intensity upon the reverted [426] feeling in virtue of its being the novel factor introducing the contrast. The physical purpose thus provides the creativity with a complex character, which is governed (i) by the Category of Conceptual Reversion, in virtue of which the secondary conceptual feeling arises, (ii) by the Category of Transmutation, in virtue of which conceptual feeling can be transmitted as physical feeling, (iii) by the Category of Subjective Harmony, in virtue of which the subjective forms of the two conceptual feelings are adjusted to procure the subjective aim, and (iv) by the Category of Subjective Intensity, in virtue of which the aim is determined to the attainment of balanced intensity from feelings integrated in virtue of near-identity, and contrasted in virtue of reversions.

( 12 ) Page 291:A member of the subjective species is, in its primary character, an element in the definiteness of the subjective form of a feeling. It is a determinate way in which a feeling can feel. It is an emotion, or an intensity, or an adversion, or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain. It defines the subjective form of feeling of one actual entity. Al may be that component of A's constitution through which A is objectified for B. Thus when B feels A1, it feels 'A with that feeling.' In this way, the eternal object which contributes to the definiteness of A's feeling becomes an eternal object contributing to the definiteness of A as an objective datum in B's prehension of A. The eternal object can then function both subjectively and relatively. It can be a private element in a subjective form, and also an agent in the objectification. In this latter character it may come under the operation of the Category of Transmutation and become a characteristic of a nexus as objectified for a percipient.

( 13 ) Page 292:For example. 'redness' may first be the definiteness of an emotion which is a subjective form in the experience of A; it then becomes an agent whereby A is objectified for B, so that A is objectified in respect to its prehension with this emotion. But A may be only one occasion of a nexus, such that each of its members is objectified for B by a prehension with an analogous subjective form. Then by the operation of the Category of Transmutation, the nexus is objectified for B as illustrated by the characteristic 'redness.' The nexus will also be illustrated by its mathematical forms which are eternal objects of the objective species.

( 14 ) Page 310:Thus a strain has a complex distribution of geometrical significance. There is the geometrical 'seat' which is composed of a limited set of loci which are certain sets of points. These points belong to the volume defining the standpoint of the experient subject. A strain is a complex integration of simpler feelings; and it includes in its complex character simpler feelings in which the qualities concerned are more particularly associated with [473] this seat. But the geometrical interest which dominates the growth of a strain lifts into importance the complete lines, planes, and three-dimensional flats, which are defined by the seat of the strain. In the process of integration, these wider geometrical elements acquire implication with the qualities originated in the simpler stages. The process is an example of the Category of Transmutation; and is to be explained by the intervention of intermediate conceptual feelings. Thus extensive regions, which are penetrated by the geometrical elements concerned, acquire objectification by means of the qualities and geometrical relations derived from the simpler feelings., This type of objectification is characterized by the close association of qualities and definite geometrical relations; It is the basis of the so-called 'projection' of sensa. This projection of sensa in a strain takes many forms according to the differences among various strains.

( 15 ) Page 317:It is the mark of a high-grade organism to eliminate, by negative prehension, the irrelevant accidents in its environment, and to elicit massive attention to every variety of systematic order. For this purpose, the Category of Transmutation is the master-principle. By its operation each nexus can be prehended in terms of the analogies among its own members, or in terms of analogies among the members of other nexus but yet relevant to it. In this way the organism in question suppresses the mere multiplicities of things, and designs its own contrasts. The canons of art are merely the expression, in specialized forms, of the requisites for depth of experience. The principles of morality are allied to the canons of art, in that they also express, in another connection, the same requisites. Owing to the principle that contemporary actual entities occur in relative independence, the nexus of contemporary actual entities are peculiarly favourable for this transference of systematic qualities from other nexus to themselves. For a difficulty arises in the operation of the Category of Transmutation, when a characteristic prevalent among the individual entities of one nexus is to be transferred to another nexus treated as a unity.

( 16 ) Page 323:The notions which have led to the phraseology characterizing the 'projected' sensa as 'secondary qualities' arise out of a fundamental difference between 'strain-loci' and their associated 'presented durations.' A strain-locus is entirely determined by the experient in question. It extends beyond that experient indefinitely, although defined by geometrical elements entirely within the extensive region which is the standpoint of the experient. The 'seat' of the strain-locus, which is a set of points within this region, is sufficient to effect this definition of the complete strain-locus by the aid of the straight lines termed the 'projectors.' These straight lines are nexus whose geometrical relations are forms ingredient in a strain-feeling with these nexus as data. Presentational immediacy arises from the integration of a strain-feeling and a 'physical purpose,' so that, by the Category of Transmutation, the sensum involved in the 'physical purpose' is projected onto some external focal region defined by projectors.

7. the Category of Subjective Harmony

( 1 ) Page 27:(vii ) the Category of Subjective Harmony. The valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by the adaptation of those feelings to be contrasted elements congruent with the subjective aim.

( 2 ) Page 235:[359] prehensions are not atomic; they can be divided into other prehensions and combined into other prehensions. Also prehensions are not independent of each other. The relation between their subjective forms is constituted by the one subjective aim which guides their formation. This correlation of subjective forms is termed 'the mutual sensitivity' of prehensions (cf. Part I, Ch. II, Sect. III, Categoreal Obligation VII, 'the Category of Subjective Harmony').

( 3 ) Page 249: Thus the first phase of the mental pole is conceptual [381] reproduction, and the second phase is a phase of conceptual reversion. In this second phase the proximate novelties are conceptually felt. This is the process by which the subsequent enrichment of subjective forms, both in qualitative pattern, and in intensity through contrast, is made possible by the positive conceptual prehension of relevant alternatives.1 There is a conceptual contrast of physical incompatibles. This is the category which, as thus stated. Seems to limit the strict application of Plato's principle of reminiscence, and of Hume's principle of recollection. Probably it does not contradict anything that Plato meant by his principle. But it does limit the rigid application of Hume's principle. Indeed Hume himself admitted exceptions. It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance. But, as the category states, reversion is always limited by the necessary inclusion of elements identical with elements in feelings of the antecedent phase. By the Category of Subjective Unity, and by the seventh Category of Subjective Harmony, to be explained later, all origination of feelings is governed by the subjective imposition of aptitude for final synthesis. Also by the Category of objective identity this aptitude always has its ground in the two-way functionings of self-identical elements. Then in synthesis there must always be a ground of identity and an aim at contrast. The aim at contrast arises from the depth of intensity promoted by contrast. The joint necessity of this ground of identity, and this aim at contrast, is partially expressed in this category of conceptual Reversion. This 'aim at contrast' is the expression of the ultimate creative purpose that each unification shall achieve some maximum depth of intensity of feeling, subject to the conditions of its concrescence. This ultimate purpose is formulated in category VIII.

( 4 ) Page 254: Category VII. the Category of Subjective Harmony. The valuations of conceptual feelings are mutually determined by their adaptation to be joint elements in a satisfaction aimed at by the subject.

( 5 ) Page 267:In an intellectual feeling the datum is the generic contrast between a nexus of actual entities and a proposition with its logical subjects members of the nexus. In every generic contrast its unity arises from the two-way functioning of certain entities which are components in each of the contrasted factors. This unity expresses the conformation to the second categoreal condition (the Category of objective identity). The common 'subject' entertaining the two feelings effects an integration whereby each of these actual entities obtains its one role of a two-way functioning in the one generic contrast. As an element in the subject no objectified actual entity can play two disconnected parts. There can only be one analysable part. Thus what in origination is describable as a pair of distinct ways of functioning of each actual entity in the two factors of the generic contrast respectively is realized in the subject as one role with a two-way aspect. This two-way aspect is unified as 'contrast.' This one analysable part involves in itself the contrast between the sheer matter of fact, namely, what the objectified actual entity in question contributes to the objectified nexus in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality of the same actual entity for playing its assigned part in the predicative pattern of the proposition. in the eventuality of the proposition's realization. This contrast is what has been termed the 'affirmation-negation contrast.' It is the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the propositional feeling. It is the contrast between 'in fact' and 'might be,' in respect to particular instances in this actual world. The subjective form of the feeling of this contrast is consciousness. Thus in experience, consciousness arises by reason of intellectual feelings, and in proportion to the variety and intensity of such feelings. But, in conformity with the seventh [408] categoreal condition (the Category of Subjective Harmony), subjective forms, which arise as factors in any feeling, are finally in the satisfaction shared in the unity of all feelings; all feelings acquire their quota of irradiation in consciousness.

( 6 ) Page 279:When this reverted conceptual feeling acquires a relatively high intensity of upward valuation in its subjective form, the resulting integration of physical feeling, primary conceptual feeling, and secondary conceptual feeling, produces a more complex physical purpose than in the former case when the reverted conceptual feeling was negligible. There is now the physical feeling as valued by its integration with the primary conceptual feeling, the integration with the contrasted secondary conceptual feeling, the heightening of the scale of subjective intensity by the introduction of conceptual contrast, and the concentration of this heightened intensity upon the reverted [426] feeling in virtue of its being the novel factor introducing the contrast. The physical purpose thus provides the creativity with a complex character, which is governed (i) by the Category of Conceptual Reversion, in virtue of which the secondary conceptual feeling arises, (ii) by the Category of Transmutation, in virtue of which conceptual feeling can be transmitted as physical feeling, (iii) by the Category of Subjective Harmony, in virtue of which the subjective forms of the two conceptual feelings are adjusted to procure the subjective aim, and (iv) by the Category of Subjective Intensity, in virtue of which the aim is determined to the attainment of balanced intensity from feelings integrated in virtue of near-identity, and contrasted in virtue of reversions.

8. the Category of Subjective Intensity

( 1 ) Page 27:(viii) the Category of Subjective Intensity. The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject, and (b) in the relevant future. This double aim--at the immediate present and the relevant future--is less divided than appears on the surface. For the determination of the relevant future, and the anticipatory feeling respecting provision for its grade of intensity, are elements affecting the immediate complex of feeling. The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future. The relevant future consists of those elements in the anticipated future which are felt with effective intensity by the present subject by reason of the real potentiality for them to be derived from itself.

( 2 ) Page 277:Categoreal Condition VIII. the Category of Subjective Intensity. The subjective aim, whereby there is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject, and (b) in the relevant future.

( 3 ) Page 279:When this reverted conceptual feeling acquires a relatively high intensity of upward valuation in its subjective form, the resulting integration of physical feeling, primary conceptual feeling, and secondary conceptual feeling, produces a more complex physical purpose than in the former case when the reverted conceptual feeling was negligible. There is now the physical feeling as valued by its integration with the primary conceptual feeling, the integration with the contrasted secondary conceptual feeling, the heightening of the scale of subjective intensity by the introduction of conceptual contrast, and the concentration of this heightened intensity upon the reverted [426] feeling in virtue of its being the novel factor introducing the contrast. The physical purpose thus provides the creativity with a complex character, which is governed (i) by the Category of Conceptual Reversion, in virtue of which the secondary conceptual feeling arises, (ii) by the Category of Transmutation, in virtue of which conceptual feeling can be transmitted as physical feeling, (iii) by the Category of Subjective Harmony, in virtue of which the subjective forms of the two conceptual feelings are adjusted to procure the subjective aim, and (iv) by the Category of Subjective Intensity, in virtue of which the aim is determined to the attainment of balanced intensity from feelings integrated in virtue of near-identity, and contrasted in virtue of reversions.

9. the Category of Freedom and Determination

( 1 ) Page 27:(ix) the Category of Freedom and Determination. The concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free. This category can be condensed into the formula, that in each concrescence whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence. This subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis, and beyond it there is nonentity. This final decision is the reaction of the unity of the whole to its own internal determination. This reaction is the final modification of emotion, appreciation, and purpose. But the decision [42] of the whole arises out of the determination of the parts, so as to be strictly relevant to it.