

**Emotional Intellect
and Whitehead's view of Civilization**

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It is well-known that Whitehead has developed on the basis of the philosophy of organism a kind of the metaphysical cosmology which deals with the universe by extending it so far as to the present cosmic epoch and further that this cosmic epoch has been conceived of in the context of its preceding as well as succeeding cosmic epochs. However how grand-scale this cosmological framework is articulated, the note-worthy fact is that he has laid the foundations of constructing it on actual entities. According to him, actual entities are final realities of which the universe is made up.

Actual entities (or occasions) are ideas which have been constructed by Whitehead after the model of primary elements constitutive of electro-magnetic field of physics such as electrons, protons and so forth. The feature characteristic of his philosophy lies in that he submits to generalization these ideas derived from a special field of physics through the "method of imaginative rationalization" (PR, 5), and applies them to all things beyond physics, no matter whether they are inorganic or organic. Hence, he holds the view that not only things such as stones but also other organic things inclusive of plants, animals, and human beings are all actual entities. Even God is said to be an actual entity, although the phrase "actual occasion" is not applicable to Him or Her.

We have so far made it clear that the actual entity is a key word for understanding Whitehead's philosophy of organism. Then, we are able to submit this actual entity to an object of observation and enumerates its characteristic features such that it is originally derived from a restricted field of physics and then is generalized by imagination so as to be applicable beyond physics to all things including humans, that it is a living organism which is composed of the physical pole and of the mental one, that it is a spatio-temporal unity, etcetera, etcetera. However this may be, we must ask whether, in an attempt to understand Whitehead's philosophy, it is an appropriate approach to set up such a concept of actual entity provided with various characteristics and to begin with it. It is a well-known fact that Descartes took his departure in his philosophical development from the so-called "thinking I" and Kant from the "finite rational human being." As for Descartes, "the thinking I" is a generic

notion applicable to any persons whomsoever, just as "the finite rational human being" is the same for Kant. The question is to ask whether it is appropriate to think that the concept of an actual entity plays the same role in Whitehead's philosophy as "the thinking I" does in Descartes and "the finite rational being" does in Kant.

In accounting for the Whiteheadian process-relational philosophy, I think it necessary to draw attention not to the concept of an actual entity but to an actual entity as it is understood as the "I" which exists here and now. In his view, an actual entity is conceived as the subject of experience. I think it is no good sticking to the concept of an actual entity, enumerating its various characteristics and setting up the starting point on it to explain his philosophy. Instead, when we speak of an actual entity as the subject of experience, the most important thing for us to do is to ~~dive~~^{del} into the experience a step further and to explore his philosophy by beginning with the "I" which exists here and now, because this existential "I" which actually exists on each occasion is exactly what Whitehead describes in terms of an actual entity as it is understood as the subject of experience. Unlike the Cartesian thinking "I," such an "I" is unique to and only accessible and directly and evidently known to me on each occasion. At this point, I am sure that Whitehead's philosophy is in keeping with existentialism and bears witness to the fact that he already went ahead of his generation and was in anticipation of the arrival of postmodernism, as Professor Griffin has made it explicit in his articles and books. By standing on this position, I am able to make sure of the Whiteheadian thesis that all things, no matter whether they are inorganic or organic, are said to be actual entities. For example, although Whitehead conceives of even an inorganic thing such as a stone as an actual entity, I can confirm this contention by an analogical way of thinking through which I extend my here-and-now experience to a stone in an analogical manner based on sympathy. Usually, a stone is given account of as determined by the cause-effect relationship. And a cause (A) and an effect (B) are conceived as to their reality to be of one piece with each other. But according to Whitehead, for A, this causal relation is external, while for B, it is internal. This means that, while A is independent of this relation, this relation is constitutive of the very essence of B. So far as reality is concerned, I can say on the basis of my own experience that B is more than A so that B has something novel which A falls short of. This is the view of the qualitative

asymmetry between cause and effect, on the basis of which Whitehead conceives of even a stone as an actual entity, which we cannot think is completely devoid of mentality, and hence of freedom, albeit almost close in its degree to the zero. This is way, according to Whitehead, we are able to communicate to any other things, whether they are non-human or human, on the basis of an actual entity which exists uniquely to me here and now.

2

He holds the view that an actual entity consists in a concrescent process, with which we are able to come to grips by taking into consideration its three consecutive phases of the "to become, to do, and to be." An actual entity is said to dwell in its own world. The phase of the "to become" is its primordial one in which it takes hold of its past world in such a way that it receives it from over there into here. Such a reception Whitehead describes in terms of a physical prehension, which is said to be something physical. According to Hartshorne, this is a feeling of feelings, that is, a feeling conformal to its preceding feelings. Hence, we can say that in such a phase, an actual entity is causally determined by its own world.

The phase of the "to do" is a supplemental one, in which an actual entity, whatever it may be, goes beyond the physical determination and gives birth to something novel, which he conceives of by having recourse to ideas which are by him called eternal objects. In this respect, actual entities whatsoever are said to be free, although the degree of freedom differs according as which kind of actual entities is thereby referred to. Thus, an actual entity, while determined by its own world physically, determines itself conceptually, trying to achieve something novel in pursuit of a purpose. This is why Whitehead describes all actual entities ranging from inorganic things through non-human living things to human beings in terms of "physical purposes" (PR, 276). It is not until an actual entity brings into synthesis in its own concrescent process the physical and the conceptual that it is said to become conscious. In the primordial phase, an actual entity we can say is conformal to its own past, and hence in this respect, natural, and in the supplemental one, insofar as it achieves something novel, it can be said to be artificial in a sense. In this way, the features of an actual entity we are able to characterize in terms of naturalness and artificiality.

As regards consciousness, Whitehead maintains that it is not the case with our experience that consciousness is presupposed primordially, but that it first of all comes into being in the supplemental phase. However, in the ordinary, epistemological way of thinking, consciousness is presupposed in experience, and on the basis of the subject-object dual relation, the subject of consciousness tries to grasp things which are objects existing independently of the subject. This is the traditional concept of intellect, which has so far induced us human beings to construct a mechanistic civilization of technology. It has been known to us to a great extent, however, that this kind of mechanistic view of nature and of the world is a threat to the existence of non-human as well as human beings. On the contrary, Whitehead describes the primordial phase of an actual entity in terms of a physical prehension, and a positive physical prehension is a feeling, namely, something emotional. This means that here the emotional precedes the intellectual, which arises out of the emotional in parallel with the emergence of consciousness. And when the intellect performs its function in conformity with the emotional, we are able to call this kind of intellect the emotional intellect. We must here distinguish between two kinds of intellect. One of them is the intellect in the ordinary sense of the word, and the other is the emotional, process-relational concept of intellect.

The phase of the "to be" of an actual entity is a final one, in which it brings into synthesis the physical and the conceptual, that is to say, conformal-natural feelings and mental-artificial feelings. Whitehead calls this final phase "satisfaction," in which an actual entity turns out "to be" what it is and realizes its own substantiality. Worthy of note here is the fact that, while he asserts that an actual entity is not a substance, the actual entity which finishes achieving its own self-realization is said to be a substance. After satisfaction, an actual entity, that is, the subject of an experience is transformed into the object. This means that its subjective immediacy perishes and is objectified as a datum for a succeeding actual entity. And what is more, according to *Adventures of Ideas*, conformal, natural feelings and mental, artificial feelings, when they are brought into synthesis, give rise to the value called "truthful beauty." Hence, after an actual entity achieves and enjoys in its own conspicious process the value of truthful beauty, even though it perishes, it contributes the value thus realized to a succeeding actual entity. In addition, according to Whitehead,

that an actual entity is objectified as the datum for a succeeding one means that it contributes itself to the advancement of the world by becoming one of its composite elements. Therefore, it follows from what has above been said that an actual entity, while dwelling in its own world and causally determined by it, turns out to become an agent determinative of it, and thus, a focal point of the world-formation. A flux or stream of life is oftentimes spoken of. Each of actual entities, while determined by its own world and determining it, becomes an agent constitutive of this flux of life. In reference to this flux of life, Whitehead speaks of the famous sentence "The many become one and are increased by one." We are perhaps able to speak of the same thing without thereby distorting the original meaning by saying that "The many become one and the one becomes the many." This is the sentence which reminds us of the dictum repeatedly remarked by Nishida Kitaro as expressive of the core of his philosophy.

3

I am convinced that the above-noted three phases of an actual entity's concrescence correspond respectively to the three modes of our perceptual experience. Whitehead first of all speaks of the perception in the mode of causal efficacy, then of the perception in the mode of presentational immediacy and finally of the perception in the mode of symbolic reference. As the subject of consciousness, we ordinarily perceive something existing outside of us as an object of observation. This is an ordinary type of intellectual grasp, in which the subject of consciousness which is conceived as something substantial comes to grasp the object which is also conceived as a substance. In accordance with the Cartesian philosophy, a substance is something which is in no need of every other thing for the purpose of its own existence. Hence, substances are conceived as existing independently of one another and are related to one another externally. In this way, the ordinary concept of substance helps us bring a flux of life to a stop. Whitehead describes this type of perception in terms of the subjectivist principle. Contrariwise, in the system of perception he takes hold of in favor, we have already above made it clear that the physical precedes the conceptual, that is to say, that the perception in the mode of causal efficacy precedes the perception in the mode of presentational immediacy. And by bringing into synthesis these two modes of perception, the perception in the mode of symbolic reference furnishes us with knowledge on each

occasion. This type of perception he describes in terms of the reformed subjectivist principle. And we must make sure of the fact that it is this reformed subjectivist principle that renders us capable of grasping things as existing within and along with a flux of life. I must also make it clear that the intellect which is at work in this reformed subjectivist principle is not the intellect in its ordinary sense of the word but the above-mentioned emotional intellect. In the system of perception in which the perception in the mode of causal efficacy precedes that of presentational immediacy, if this before-after relationship is put into disruption, and if we stick to the perception in the mode of presentational immediacy without regard to and in defiance of the perception in the mode of causal efficacy, we fall victim to the intellect in the ordinary sense of the word and cannot get out of the so-called "solipsism of the present moment" (PR, 81).

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I am sure that it is the emotional intellect that renders an actual entity capable of dealing with every other thing, whatever it may be, as something living. Through this emotional intellect, an actual entity, while it is itself living, and is comprised of the physical pole and the conceptual one, is able to grasp every other thing as something which achieves the value of "truthful beauty" by uniting within itself these contrasted poles in its own way. The emotional intellect makes it possible for us to behave not only to one another but also to non-human beings in the natural world as what are susceptible of creating the value of "truthful beauty, each in its own way. Hence, I am deeply convinced that it is the emotional intellect that induces us human beings to produce technologies gentle to the natural environment so as not to lead to its pollutions. What is at stake here is a process-relational view of nature, which is completely different from the above-noted mechanistic view of nature., according to which the world of nature is conceived of as causally-dominated and hence scientifically-controlled mere aggregates of dead things. We must here keep in mind that the former view of nature is what has been referred to in the history of Western philosophy by means of the terms "*natura naturans*" and in Japanese philosophy by means of the terms "*jinen*." *Jinen* is distinguished from *shizen*, despite the fact that these two words are denoted by the same Chinese letters. The latter is meant to refer to nature whose characteristic features are grasped objectively by the intellect in the ordinary sense of the word as what are controlled through

the natural laws. On the other hand, the former is understood to mean living nature, whose characteristics are described both in terms of the "of its own accord" which means naturalness and of the "on its own initiative" which means artificiality. And what is of special importance to be noted here is that this grasp of things as something living always takes place with the world as a whole being at its background. In an attempt to conceive of something, an actual entity, as the subject of experience, tries to set up the physical and the conceptual which comprise of it, as contrasted opposites at the background and by bringing them into synthesis at the foreground, tries to grasp it in the form of a proposition. Whitehead speaks of a propositional feeling, which serves as a lure for enticing the subject of experience into heightening its in-depth intensity. In this way, a holistic way of thinking typical to Whitehead's philosophy is performed, resulting in the achievement of grasping things, whatever they may be, as bringing about the value of "truthful beauty," each in its own way.

5

I have already referred to the rhythm of life in which an actual entity is involved in its reciprocal relation to the world, by saying that "The many become the one and the one becomes the many." While Whitehead is repeatedly cited as saying that the universe conspires to produce an actual entity, this statement has reference to the first half dictum that the many become the one. And the latter half dictum that the one becomes the many is understood to imply that an actual entity, on each occasion in which it achieves its self actualization and then perishes, becomes a focal point of the world-formation by becoming one element constitutive of the world. In this way, that an actual entity realizes itself by bringing the physical and the conceptual in its concrescence simultaneously gives occasion to the "transition" through which the world makes its continuous advance. Then, we must ask what this direction of advancement consists in, of which the world is in pursuit. The answer is given by Whitehead that it is in the direction of civilization. As regards civilization, he is cited as saying that "A man can be civilized, and a whole society can be civilized" (AI, 273), or that "a society is to be termed civilized whose members participate in the five qualities... Truth, Beauty, Adventure, Art, Peace" (AI. 285).

Whitehead's statement that "a man can be civilized" is paraphrased in such a way that actual entities constitutive of a person, while each of

them bringing into synthesis the physical and the conceptual in its concrescence and thus achieving the value of "truthful beauty," transit to one another and conduce to eventually being civilized in the process of this transition. What does "adventure" mean? It means that an actual entity, while thus realizing its self-actualization, goes beyond itself and becomes objectified to a succeeding one as a datum to be incorporated into the latter concrescent process. What is at stake here is the moral act of an actual entity to realize itself for the sake of the other. What does "art" mean? It means that an actual entity, while undergoing naturalness on the one hand and artificiality on the other, brings these contrasts into synthetic harmony and enjoys it in itself. At stake here is an aesthetic experience, so to speak. Finally, what does "peace" mean? It means that an actual entity, in spite of losing its subjective immediacy after its self-realization, is incorporated into the world as one of the elements constitutive of it and thus settles itself down peacefully in the whole. According to Whitehead, that an actual entity becomes one constituent element of the world means at the same time that it is preserved in the divine memory. So, the value of peace has somewhat a reference to religion. In this way, I think that it is the emotional intellect that makes it possible to put into praxis "one of the motives of a complete cosmology to construct a system of ideas which brings the aesthetic, moral and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their origin in natural science (PR xii).

6

Whitehead holds the view that a society or the world is said to be civilized when its members participate in the above-noted five qualities. Then, is it permissible for us to think of civilization as the final purpose of which the world is in pursuit? Yes, it is certainly so. But we must keep it in mind here that, as has above been said, on each occasion in which an actual entity participates in the above-noted five values in its own way, we can say that civilization is already brought to realization. Nevertheless, civilization has not yet been realized finally. So if we think that it can be brought to completion in accordance with a straight line, we cannot do justice to Whitehead's thought. From what has been said so far, the conclusion is drawn that we are able to describe civilization in terms of the phrase "already, but not yet." At stake here is the spiral view of history typical to the Whiteheadian metaphysical cosmology. It must be distinguished from the linear view of history which can be found in the

Christian idea of eschatology on the one hand and from the circular view of history which can be recognized in the Greek conception of nature on the other. Rather it must be noted that the essential feature characteristic of the spiral view of history lies in its attempt to bring into synthesis these other two contrasted views of history. In the final part of his *Process and Reality*, he is quoted as saying that "It is as true to say that God creates the world, as that the world creates God" (PR, 348). I think that this sentence does not yield any change of meaning, if we replace "the world" by the words "finite actual entities" composite of it. If this thesis is tenable, I think it permissible to say about Whitehead's view that God and finite actual entities are co-creators of the world. While God and finite actual entities stand in contrasted opposites and are mutually requiring of each other, they contribute to the civilization of the world in a spiral way.